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Christie:
... -four, and this interview is with Mr. John Wallace,
for the Owens Glass History Project. And, if we could begin with
just your personal background, education, your work experience, so
we know where you're coming from.
John: Okay. Uhm, for a long time I was a computer type. I worked
at Eastern Airlines as a systems analyst for the U.S. Army-this was
back in the early '60's.
And then uh, I went to graduate school
and got my masters and doctorate at the University of Florida.
Started a computer company with three other guys in the late '60's,
called Computer Management Corporation.
In the '70's, I lived in
Africa, in east Africa.
I started the management science at the
University of Nairobi.
I was on a Fulbright Scholarship
Fellowship.
And then worked in west Africa for two years for an
international labor organization, it's a U.N. agency. And there I
was increasingly in certain types of management consulting, taught
management team building, and things like that.
And from there we went to Switzerland, lived in Geneva,
Switzerland, for twelve years.
I worked with the International
Labor Organization there.
We did small enterprise development,
taught management, training, setting up productivity centers around
the world. And then I kind of took early retirement in '89, wanted
to work with small businesses back in my home state of West
Virginia. And been here at Flori-, or been here at Marshall since
'89.
I'm the Small Business Institute director here.
That means
that we put student teams together and do consulting projects for
companies.
We have projects this term with companies like
uh ... Persinger Supply down in Prichard, and a little company called
Lee Technology, these kinds of things here ... called Drumwicks.
I
do a lot of, a lot of work in the community with companies.
Uh ... and that's where I took some interest in Owens on several
occasions.
I had students at different points in time would go
over in Owens-Brockway and talk to people over there, and see if
there were ways we could help, things like that.
Christie:

But it wasn't really a small business.

John: No, but in my principles of management course, uh, say in a
particular section there might be 25 students. Each student has to
have a
little individual project, has to find a manager and go
talk to that manager about problems. And uh, this one, the first
time we had a student wandering around there was .. . must have been
3, 4 years ago, by the name of Joe Cross. And he talked to people
about the problems they were having and uh, Joe had done some
training over at uh, INCO, had been a trainer at INCO, and we were
looking to see whether some of the stuff that he had done there, he
and I maybe could do at, at Owens.
Christie: Okay. Well, mostly what I want to talk to you about is
trends in American industry, starting in the late '70' s, and
talking about the technology, international competition, and change
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in ownership buyouts and that kind of thing.
So, if you could
elaborate on any or all of those.
And also, give us maybe some
definitions, what a leverage buyout is, that kind of thing.
John:
One of the things I did was I pulled some information off
the uh, government statistics on different industries, and the
glass industry I looked at. And we looked at it from 1 77 to 1 87,
for examples ... it was all we could find in the library.
And uh,
looked at the ... the glass industry really makes up flat glass, like
windshields and windows and so on.
And containers.
And then
blown and pressed glass, which includes things like the art glass
companies that we have around here.
And then uh, what they call
purchase glass, which is largely companies that purchase glass and
then make things like lenses-they're more in the grinding business
and so on.
We have two companies like that,
locally.
Owens ... Alcon-Cilco is one.
But uh, the uh, that's uh, eye
glasses, ophthalmology-type of lenses, and that's not included
here. But lenses for telescopes and uh, headlights and things like
that, are in this third group, or fourth group.
So there's four
different groups of companies in the glass industry.
And if you
look at the trends over the, over that period, 1 77 to 1 87, you see
that uh, uh .... sales, let's get down here [referring to printed
material] ... sales, which is actually this area here, went up in
some of those sections of industry by 60% or 30%, or in the case of
lenses, almost doubled in that period.
But keep looking at the
fact that the container section didn't necessarily increase. Glass
containers were increasing in that period, but not as much as say
some of the other ... this actually should be sales ... sales over
there.
I messed that up when I picked it up. Employment dropped
in all four sectors, all three of those four sectors. One sector
it didn't, employment didn't drop end of that period, was purchase
glass, the lenses, so you had expansion of employment and sales in
one of those four different sectors of the industry. What's really
interesting to me is the fact that productivity increased in all
parts of that industry. Where you had the industry cutting down on
employment, but uh, increasing sales, but what's really dramatic is
that people were producing more.
Value-added per employee means
that the sales, minus the cost of the materials, the limestone and
the sand, and so on, that goes into the glass, the sales minus the
cost of the goods that they had to purchase, the raw materials,
divided
by
the
employees,
that
basically
all
increased
throughout ... throughout the period. While the uh, the flat glass
sector did the best in terms of improving sales per employee,
value-added per employee, the sector that Owens was in didn't do
that badly.
It went up by a hundred twenty-two percent.
So, it
didn't do that badly. You can see in this graph, I know we're not
on t. v. here, but you see in this graph that the flat glass
industry had a very nice value-added per employee increase and the
other three sectors went up a little bit, but not tremendously.
So, I looked at those numbers, just to see what the industry was
doing. And uh, everybody was increasing sales, increasing valueadded, and three of those four sectors were decreasing employ-you
3

know, decreasing employment.
And in the sector we' re
about, the container sector, employment was down by 40%.

talking

Christie: Does this have a lot to do with technology, you think?
(uh ... ) Are they able to produce more, with fewer employees?
John:
Technology always has a way of, it always has a role to
play ... in this.
And I noticed in your interviews, that we're
talking about the Owens-Brockway plant as being an old plant,
originally designed around gravity feed, rather than mechanical
feeds, and computer feeds and so on.
And I, I would think that
there was a problem in terms of updating the technology of Owens,
in keeping it up to date.
But, tech ... you know, technology, we
have to go back to the beginning of the Huntington plant. And at
the time it was, it was open, it was technologically advanced for
it's time. I understand that Mr. Brockway had a lot of patents and
uh, and so on. The, I think it had somewhat to do with technology.
The other thing, though, that one noticed, that my students noticed
and I picked it up here in the other interviews, though, was your
management and your workers have to stay up to date.
Uh ... and I
think this is, I noticed that the discussion in here that their
management in many cases, hadn't gone to college and their, it's
difficult if you have workers that have, aren't very numerate, and
aren't very literate, uh, to keep their technologically up to date.
Let me tell you a story about that.
About two and a half years
ago, the Huntington Labor Management Council invited a team of six
people from Union Carbide, over in Charleston, to come and talk to
companies here in Huntington about how they had laid the framework
for technological improvement and so on.
And uh, there was a
lovely evening, these six people, three unions, three non-union,
there, and it was basically the fellow who had been the president
of the union steelworkers over in Charleston ... and back in '88,
said, "You know, my daddy was a union man and I was a union man,
too.
I'm a union man, strong union man, but I walked out beside
the building one day and looked around and I said, you know, we
were gonna be a parking lot if we don't start cooperating with
management and getting our act together."
So the union and
management invited some people down from WVU in '88, August of '88
to run some workshops. And uh, they built teams between management
and union and uh, one of the first exercises was kind of cute.
They, this trainer from uh, West Virginia University had management
and union teams sitting across from each other, across the table,
building bridges out of pieces of wood, actually, physically, this
team building a bridge and this builder building a bridge. And the
metaphor that he was doing would say, "Management and workers
working together can build bridges."
And this uh, this union
president said, "I was really amazed that here I could build a
bridge with this SOB I've been fighting with for all my life."
There were a numb~r of stories like that.
I remember walking out
that evening, talking to a couple of the management people from
Owens-Brockway and I don't remember who it was. But I remember, I
got the impression that they were glazed over, that they saw in
4

effect, the future and they just couldn't figure out how they were
gonna get there. So uh, I think it was technology. But technology
really isn't machinery. Technology is in your head, you know ... if
I didn't know how to turn this computer on, it wouldn't make any
difference, you know, how much technology I've got, if I don't know
how to use it.
I think there were a number of things that were
missing in the '70's and '80's, with respect to Owens uh, locally
here, that they just couldn't im- .... implement the kinds of
technology that was necessary to implement.
Christie: Well, certainly, the management worker relations were so
much different when there was like a parental kind of attitude in
the entire plant.
What ... what do you think was involved in the
transition? Why do they need this building bridges now, when it
didn't exist before and the plant was very productive before?
John:
I was struck a couple of years ago in a book on total
quality management, a quote from the head of Mitsuchita saying, in
effect, "We in Japan are gonna bury you in the United States,
because we' re not tailorized, 11 was the term he used.
He was
saying, you know, that plants had been built around the turn of the
century and in the ' 2 0' s and so on.
And followed the uh, the
scientific management principles that were very popular in the
'20 1 s, where uh, Frederick Taylor believed that any kind of
thinking that went on in the plant floor was probably wrong. And
Taylor interestingly didn't want management to think, either. Uh,
the managers that Fredrick Winslow Taylor knew were guys that
didn't know how to analyze work very well, either. And he always
wanted, he always had the idea that all of the planning uh, should
be in a planning department by engineering consultants who knew how
to, how to do all the analysis and so on, and he didn't want the,
he didn't want the workers thinking and he didn't trust the
managers to do a lot of thinking, either. (mmmh) The other aspect
of your question is that, that it takes two to tango in this case.
If management plays the role of parent, somebody's got to play the
role of child. And uh, the plants around here that still have the
older culture, and you talk to the workers and their first line
supervisors, they will say that, "I hate to cross the road to get
into the plant, I hate getting out of the car in the morning uh, to
uh, uh, walk across the parking lot and go in the plant, because
I'm an adult and you know, I might be a preacher, or a churchman or
a mother, I'm a father, I'm raising my kids and when I walk inside
that plant, I'm treated like a child."
So, it's a big culture
change to move away from that, and, but some plants have. ACF here
uh, is a plant that has a similar long history, hundred years, a
hundred years of history. And back in the late 1 80 1 s, early 1 90 1 s,
they were told by some of their major customers that they had to
get their quality up, and uh, I think it was EXXON that told ACF,
saying, you know, ·first, ACF makes these big uh, center flow tank
cars, box cars, and they said, "Your first car off the line," say
on an order of 120 of these big box cars, "is quite different from
the last one. We really don't know what the last one's gonna look
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like." That quality changes as you go along.
And then, uh, ACF
had, got shut down when it lost it's uh, EXXON contract.
EXXON
said, "Well, we're gonna go to one of your two competitors and get
these cars built."
Uh, notice in the case of ACF, there is no
international competition.
You don't have these boxcars coming
from Japan. But in the time that they were shut down, a period of
I forget ... six or eight months, plant management, particularly a
guy by the name of Ernie Golder, said, "We're gonna put quality in
here. We're gonna have participative management, we're not gonna
have this parent-child relationship." And Ernie would say, things
like, "You know, we pay for their hands and they bring their brains
for free-it's a big waste not to, not to, not to utilize the other
resource. And uh, it, it was a culture change. I remember talking
to the uh, to the head of the steelworkers union over there, he
says, "Well, there's no way we as union people would have
cooperated with most of the former management of ACF.
We trust
this guy and his team, so ... we wouldn't trust the others 'cause
they would screw us." So ... there is, there is, and we so it also,
at INCO.
Uh, and we see it at ACF.
It's just ... we didn't, we
didn't get our act together at Owens- Brockway, in terms of
detailorizing the workplace.
(I see)
Christie:
Mmmh.
There did seem to be a lot of mistrust between
the workers and management.
Uh, just from speaking to different
people uh, in terms of, "If we just do this, we can make it," is
what the management is saying and the workers, thought, well, you
know, there's nothing we can do, we're just trying to really,
literally get every last bit of breath out of them, you know, and
then leave them.
Which is, it's a perception the workers
have ... they worked us to death and left. So (mmm-hmm)
John: There was an aspect that I didn't see ... [clear throat] ... in
the interviews.
And I was kind of worried about it.
And that's
the aspect of quality throughout the 1 80 1 s.
There was a quality
revolution going on and when I talked about the CEO of Mitsuchita
telling about tailorization, it was in the context of it wasn't
clear that American industry was gonna be able to get it's quality
up. And uh, I noticed and I didn't see it here in the interviews,
but I think I, when Barbara talked at our fellowship a couple of
weeks ago, there were, there was a quote about "us standing around
up to our ankles in, in rejects and broken bottles" and things like
that. And the one thing that this student found, when he was over
there, was that some of the customers, such as Aneheiser Busch,
Budweiser beer bottles uh, and I mean, beer still comes in bottles
and cans, it doesn't come in plas-, I haven't seen beer in plastic
containers. Uh ... Aneheiser Busch, as I recall, was telling them,
"We want no more than one rejected bottle per million bottles."
And uh, here at the university, when you take statistics and
engineering schooL you take statistics, we talk about statistical
quality control in the context of about one mistake in a hundred or
half a mistake in a hundred or one mistake in a thousand, but our
statistics don't really talk to us about one in a million.
And
6

this was something that we're, we were learning through the '80's
from the Japanese.
These things are called six sigma standards .
Motorola is a company that did very well on the terms of getting us
way out in to the bell curve in terms of quality.
And I got the
impression that, that Owens had a lot of problems figuring out how
to get its quality up and its rejects down, its yield up and things
like that. I, so on the one hand I think it had to do perhaps with
the fact that ... that management was having trouble figuring out how
to do that. And certainly we weren't, we're still not teaching it
very well in the universities.
Uh ... that workers ... if I look at
other plants around here and where the workers are responsible for
their own quality, they have to be trained in, they have to have
certain numerate skills. They have to be able to divide you know,
a range by three and things like that; they have to have some
numeracy.
I got the impression that, that Owens hadn't, OwensBrockway hadn't done a good job of keeping the numeracy levels of
the workers up.
Maybe uh, maybe management wasn't too swift on
this, too. So, there was, in order to implement quality programs
like we have at INCO and ACF, and if you go to a company like D &
E, uh, they make uh, used to be a foundry, they make metal parts
for the automobile industry ... you walk on to, in to that plant, and
you have workers measuring the quality of their product; they're
responsible for the quality of the product. And I have a feeling
that Owens would have real difficulty getting to that point with
their own workers.
I could be wrong.
Christie : They did have quality checkers. And everyone did have
to put their number on products that they produced (mmm-hmm) for
some reason. But I don't know what beyond that, how much uh ... they
had to destroy because of defects.
Or how much they reprimanded
people who uh .... Of course, down the line, if you weren't the one
that originally started the bottle, you had to catch it down the
line. But you weren't the one who actually made the mistake, but
you were responsible for catching it, so I don't .... And I don't,
I also don't know how much training those quality checkers had.
John: One of the first things that INCO did back in the mid-'80's,
when they were laying off people, they said, "Well, the first
people we're laying off are the quality checkers, the inspectors.
We're taking out that level of the organization. And workers are
now responsible for their quality."
That was one of the first
things INCO did.
Ah ... . some of the fathers of quality, like
Demming, who just died just about a year ago, and he's the one
that's credited with teaching the Japanese in the '40's and the
'50's a lot about quality and them coming back and teaching us,
which is one of the ironies of the thing. Demming always ... Demming
always had a demonstration showing that you cannot inspect quality
indoor process.
He would uh, he would be in a training room and
you'd have a box o~, a box of red and white beads and he'd give you
a spoon and the idea's to spoon out all, some white beads so that
there were no red beads in there.
You have a process generating
white and red beads where the red stands for the defects and you
7

kind of inspect out the stuff. So you have to build quality into
the process and you alluded to, if it's somebody down the road
checking for the, the mistakes that somebody up the line is making
and they're not feeling well today, they had a bad night, they're
hung over this morning, and all this kind of stuff, then it's
somebody down the, it's too late, in many cases. And you have to
build the quality in in the upper parts. I know we have a trainer
over at ACF, a guy by the name of Dennis Deal, who's a trainer,
he's a welder, he's been on the shop floor for decades as far as I
know. And he can give stories about if the mistake starts up the
line and it carries on down the line and it gets harder and harder
and harder to fix, and the story when he tells it, sounds like for
the want of a shoe, the horse was lost, or for want of a nail, the
horse was lost and the rider was lost and the battle was lost and
the war was lost.
It just multiplies as it goes down thing.
So
uh, I have a feeling that that was, that was one of the areas,
certainly with respect to the customer saying, "Well, we expect ... "
And when a customer like Aneheiser Busch saying, "We expect one in
a million," it's not a frivolous request, because when you ship a
carton that has a broken bottle in it, then you've got a mess in
your factory.
And with that, it kind of contaminates the, you
know, it's kind of like a rotten apple in a barrel (mmm-hmm), it's
not a frivolous request. And if you're competitors can get one in
a million, uh, you need to do that, too.
And of course, the
Japanese believe that if you do things right the first time, not
only does quality go up, but costs go down. You're not spending a
lot of time wandering around in a mess. (right) We should do that
at Marshall.
Christie:
So, do you think the overall quality in our entire
country, as far as factory-produced products was better in the
'80 1 s because of our competition with Japan?
John: I think it's, I think that ... that throughout ... you have Ford
saying 'Quality is Job One' and things like that ... that if you go
back and look at vehicles that were produced in the '70' s and
1 80 1 s,
versus the same vehicles produced in the late 1 80 1 s and
'90's, yeah, there is a difference. There really is a difference.
Just, you know, look at the fit of the trunk lid to the fenders.
Uh ... it's a lot tighter, it's a lot tighter fit. And then, to some
extent, that was because we were measuring the wrong things.
Interestingly enough, we were trying to get, here in the United
States, trying to get stuff that was around here in the center of
a bell curve, and the Japanese were trying to get tighter and
tighter bell curves, and uh, things that fit a lot tighter, a lot
smoother.
So, you could end up with inside an automobile, you
could end up with a fuel pump or an alternator that's a a third of
the size of the one that you had on your General Motor's or Ford
car, because they, had .... bigger tolerances, so they had ... their
parts had to be bigger and heavier.
I remember when I first came
here in '89, I had a Ford Mustang and a Toyota MR2, and I was
looking at the, I was fixing something on the Toyota and I just
8

looked at the door hinges on the Mustang, versus the door hinges on
the Toyota and there's a world of difference. It was like working,
something between working in a barrel and working in a jewel box.
It was a difference.
Christie:
Yeah.
Plus the car industry seems ... I'm not sure if
it's exactly the same.
So many parts are made in other parts of
the world, and actually just assembled here, so (mmm-hmm), if they
can actually claim it's an American car, when it's only assembled
here, so ... I'm not sure how you compare that (no, that's right) to
something like a product, like these glass containers, which were
actually entirely made in one factory.
John: The, we probably are straying from the, from the topic. But
a lot of American industries were complaining that they were part
suppliers and so on, parts were coming in and we were, just in a
crate, just assembling things. But my experience with here in the
states and Europe as well, was that the Japanese manufacturers were
never particularly against uh ... their parts, having local parts
suppliers. I know particularly in England, with Nisson and Toyota,
I did some consulting in England, that your parts suppliers in
England were just, the Japanese would encourage them, they would
even bring their parts suppliers to England to show the British
parts manufacturers how to do the job. (unh) So, there was a, was
a feeling I think, I don't know it here in the states as well, but
I do know that companies like D & E and so on around here, it was
really a matter of getting out there and getting your quality up
and going out and telling people that your quality was up. I mean,
Honda, from Marysville, comes here to Huntington and tries to get
some suppliers to supply them (right, right).
So I think it was
a little bit of standoffishness on our part.
Christie: Unh. So how much or in what ways, maybe, do you think
technology was a role?
Not just in the glass industry, but in
general, in the U.S., in terms of laying off, plant closings ... ?
John: Uh ... uh ... I think that we in the United States have, let's
see, I think ... we in the United States have the highest standard of
living, this is where I started from uh, in the world.
Now, we
don't make the most money. There are five other countries in the
world that have a higher per capita income.
We lived in
Switzerland for 12 years and people make more money in Switzerland
than they do in the United States. But you pay more for a Big Mac
in Switzerland than you do in the United States.
And the person
who's working in a McDonald's gets about twice there than what they
get in working at McDonald's here in the United States. But your
rent's four times higher there.
So, what we have, we end up, our
stuff, in terms of a ... our ability to purchase things, uh, when I
lived in Europe, computers cost twice, this computer cost twice in
Europe what it does here.
But we have, we have a, uh, a higher
standard of living.
And one of the reasons for that higher
standard of living is that we go through processes of creative
9

destruction to quote Shawn Payter. And one of the things that we
do in doing that is we introduce technology.
But once again,
technology just isn't the machine-it's our knowledge of using
machines.
We ... we are an advanced people, in terms of using
machinery.
I mean, the country, this area around here of, in
Huntington, Ashland, we have some of the greatest little machine
shops in the country ... high productivity, very good people with
finger skills and things like that. So I think, while I think that
uh, it was, it was technology, and one of the things we haven't
mentioned with respect to Owens, is that a lot of liquor bottles
come, a lot of liquor comes in plastic now.
So, there was the
plastic uh, and remember the raw material in the place of plastic
for a lot of these bottles is not necessarily recyclable raw
material. It's coming straight from the refinery in plastic . One
of the things that was,
was also a problem with Owens
technologically, is that it had a program to recycle glass.
In
fact, a little company here in town by the name of Alpha Welding,
I think it is ... it makes recycled glass factories.
It's amazing.
You go to this place ... it's down by Corbin in Huntington, and it's
a guy and his wife in a great big barn. And they, when they're up
and producing, they and 28 other people make recycling glass
factories.
And there's one out at t Owens.
So you have, you had
recycled glass coming in, as opposed to virgin glass coming in as
a raw material. And so you did have the technology for recycling
the glass, the material going into the system. But you didn't have
the technology to make sure that once you came out with it at the
end was still a bottle, a set of bottles of which only one in a
million was a defect. So, there was .. . there was that other aspect
I needed to mention, in terms of technology.
I guess I really have to wander around and try to answer your
question, because I believe so strongly ... ! just did a paper on
technology transfer that the technology is up in your head.
And
you have to keep your people up and uh, up to date. I use a video
tape in class.
I don't have it here .... from a series called
"Thriving on Chaos," by Tom Peters.
And the piece of the tape I
use about a company called Quad, Quadgraphics, which is a printing
company, run by a guy by the name of Quadrachie, who's been an
entrepreneur of the year nationally a couple of times, and he's
a ... he's really good.
And interestingly enough, he's very nonauthoritarian. He says uh, "I only make two decisions a year, what
band's going to play at the Christmas party and what food we're
gonna have." He said everybody else makes decisions. He says you
usually think of managers as being the great organizers, but I'm
the great disorganizer. He says, "My job is basically to set up a
system in which everybody makes decisions all the time to improve
productivity. And I just have to disorganize them every once in a
while, so they, so they try a little harder.
And you look
at ... at ... and I was thinking about these multi-million dollar print
presses, compared to the big ... uh, uh, the technology that they had
over at Owens-Brockway.
And the thing that he kept saying that,
every of one of those print presses is, is modified a thousand
times in order to improve it's productivity, by the teams that are
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working there.
Each different team is a, in quadgraphics, each
print team, press team, is a profit center, responsibility center.
And they're responsible for improving their uh, uh, productivity.
And in this company quadgraphics, people go to train one day a
week. So, in terms, once again, in terms of technology, that, that
company,
the people in that company were improving their
technology, so that there was by the way, not only the school,
where all the employees went once a week, but also, a section
called QuadTech, which sells print presses to other printing
companies.
And you can imagine, just imagine here at OwensBrockway the teams that are improving their own print-, uh, glass
manufacturing to the point where they could sell it to other
factories.
I mean, that's something ... that's what I was saying
earlier, that the plant management saw what was going on at Union
Carbide, kind of glazed over. They said, "How in the world would
we get to that level?" because we'd have to train and train and
train.
The training was somewhere in the ... in the suburbs of
Toledo.
Christie: Yeah. I would venture to say that through all that was
happening there, that people were getting increasingly de-skilled
and alienated (mmm-hmm) from the other workers, as well as
management.
(mmm-hmm)
And just standing in their own corner,
packing bottles ... and actually not wanting to think. They didn't
want them to think. That's my perception.
John:
Yeah, it was interesting.
You said it both ways:
didn't want to think, and they didn't want them to think.
Christie:

they

Yeah, I don't know ...

John: Yeah, both things are happening.
reading the, reading these things.

I got that impression from

Christie: And for some reason, there was a real scare about change
on both the management and the workers point of view.
Nobody
really wanted to change.
It used to be great, and why can't it
still be great, and we don't want to change.
John: Mmmm-hmm. Well, I mean, that's why we have a high standard
of living, is that some companies survive and some companies die,
and if KKR was in the process of helping that in the '80's, and
unfortunately, I think KKR made more mistakes than they made, made
uh .... It was a problem in the '70's and '80's. You had companies
like uh, U.S. Steel.
I mean, at the time Andrew Carnegie was
putting together U.S. Steel, and of course, that was where our
friend, Fredrick Taylor worked, uh, that was, he uh ... what around
the Pittsburgh area, where U.S. Steel plants were, and you'd have,
Carnegie would have this plant competing against that plant, and
then they would learn from each other, and things like that. And
then U.S. Steel got in the situation where it was run by a bunch of
people who understood finance, but not how to make steel, and they
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ended buying hotels, because they could understand that. And they
bought all .... And so you had some of these people like KKR corning
in and in the case of U.S. Steel, saying, "Okay, you guys that want
to run hotels, you be that .... that bunch of shareholders and that
bunch of stuff. You people that want to make steel seriously, you
be this part." And actually, they split ... they split the uh, the
U.S.X. stock into two groups. But the point I was trying to make
was that in a lot of cases people lost their knowledge, not just at
the plant level, but all the way up through the system of what it,
what business we' re in, what do you do to make glass.
(right,
right)
Christie: How much do you know about KKR? I mean, I ... they're in
the news an awful lot about buying out different companies, but ... ?
John:
Nothing.
It's just a general impression I mean, 'cause
people like that are involved in ACF and of course, the Ravenswood
plant, and not so much KKR, but people like that, KK- ....
I own
stock in Chrysler and there's a similar problem going on right now
with Chrysler that one of these people like KKR is uh, has 14% of
Chrysler and he ... he's trying to get Chrysler to give a bigger
dividend, pay out a bigger dividend, take some of the money that
they are setting aside uh, and increase the stockholder values. Of
course, I'm in favor of that, at this point, since I....
But I
certainly don't want Chrysler to go through the two crunches that
it went through uh, in the early '80's and in the rnid-'80's.
I
mean, in the rnid-'80's they forgot what they were doing again, and
they started investing this, that and the other, rather than ....
And in fact, a recent article on Chrysler said that they were so,
the people within Chrysler were calling their ... calling their
customers poor old stupid people in the '70's and '80's because
they realized they weren't making the kind of products, but there
were people still out there buying it.
(unh) And I think General
Motors is still kind of in that situation, it hasn't caught up with
Chrysler.
Chrysler is you know, the most profitable of the
automobile companies.
It's got it's costs under control.
But
sometimes it loses sight of the necessities to invest in new
products.
And I think that was what was going on here.
And
sometimes, while orga-, groups like KKR, who don't understand much
other than finance, ah, do make more mistakes than they, you know,
than....
But the feeling that I got in reading through the
interviews, was that these were evil people.
Uh, I don't, I'm not
100% in agreement that people like KKR are evil.
I mean, I think
that because they come in and they shake up systems and they take
fat, dumb and happy management and shake 'em, take 'em by the
scruff of the neck and shake 'em up and it accounts to some extent
for our high standard of living.
(rnrnrnh) And I'm just ... I'm just
sad that uh, Owens-Brockway was one of them that wasn't able to get
it's act back together.
Christie: Yeah. I think the perception is that people involved in
leverage buyouts are not concerned at all, at all with the human
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factor.
That it's all numbers and we have to increase profit at
any cost to the human factor.
And I think that ... that that, that
that's the perception you're getting through the papers, though ...
John:
I can't disagree with them.
(yeah) I can't disagree with
them. But on the other hand, the country is based on the idea that
if we all behaved ... I worked in ... in fact, I've got a project in
Slavakia right now.
And they took in account the human factor a
lot under the socialists.
And those people are really poor.
So
uh, you can, you can go to extremes and I would agree with people
from Owens-Brockway that people like KKR are kind of an extreme.
Uh ... but at the same time, I don't know any of these people who
would like to have gone into guaranteed job situations, and places
like the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe, and end up having a good
steady job and be very, very poor, as a result of it.
Christie:
Yeah.
Now, in leverage buyouts, they're not actually
using their own money, is that correct?
Can you explain what a
leverage buyout is?
John:
Yeah.
Uh ... your, you say okay, ah, I'm a group of
financiers.
In the case of KKR in New York and San Francisco, and
I have this group of, this group of establishments, in the case of
Owens-Brockway, little factories all over the place. And uh, uh,
I can buy, I can buy them up at a good price.
And uh, I'm not
gonna use my own money-I'm going to go get money from savings and
loans, I'm gonna get money from uh, other investors, and there is,
and I'm gonna get money from uh, retirement funds and all kinds
of ... not my own money. I'm gonna borrow that, and use that to buy
out the, buy out those little companies, and shut down the ones
that there's no hope for, and then turn around the ones that I can
salvage, and uh, people are gonna pay me a lot more money for the
package after it's left. Uh ... the ... in the case of the savings and
loans, throughout the '80's, my Lord, there's a, it uh, that takes
us back to before you were born, uh, in during the Vietnam War, uh,
Johnson said, "We' re gonna have guns and butter."
And so, he
financed the Vietnam War without raising taxes. So, Nixon came in
and he had to pay off a lot of bills let's say, in summary. And so
we had inflation rates in the neighborhood of 17, 18% during the
Nixon era.
But it was simply we were paying for something we
should have paid for 7 or 8 years before.
Now, people who had
their money in savings and loans uh, at 3 and 4 and 5 and 10%, were
moving their money out of those savings and loans into money market
funds where you could 17 and 18%.
I was getting 17 and 18% on my
money at that time.
And the savings and loan said, "Hey, we're
going down the tubes."
So, Congress passed a law saying, "Well,
you can invest in ... in strange things, too, like high profit
things.
So, a lot of money from certain savings and loans went
into fuel this, these leverage buyouts and a lot of the people who
won, who had been savings and loan managers and didn't know that
kind of business, uh, got themselves burned.
And then these
savings and loans got taken over by a lot of people who were shady,
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who were crooks, or whatever.
And uh, they were putting lots of
money into, you know, we had a big overbuilding of office space,
uh, in a lot of places, in a lot of investments you know ... swamp
land and so on. (yeah) [chuckles] But uh, that was where you had
leverage buyouts. Now, where all the money was coming to finance
these, these takeovers, these mergers and acquisitions, they were
using borrowed money. That is they weren't, KKR wasn't using it's
own money; it was getting it from a lot of people who wanted quick
returns.
Uh ... let's see, what's the, what's the other aspect of
it. And then of course, there was Michael Milkin in the middle of
that, with the junk bond issue.
Because when you're buying up
assets like plants and so on, you can put, you can uh, you can uh,
issue bonds for, for those assets.
And what we had was, was a
growth of what was called junk bonds at the time, which the bonds
were issued for stuff that really you couldn't go out and touch and
pound on, and it wasn't real physical assets.
(unh)
They were,
they were for junk.
And so, some people feel he was quite a
criminal, and on the other hand, feel that he was quite innovative,
in terms of coming up with ways of financing these, these, these
uh, takeovers. But the whole idea was to come out with a package
of assets at the end of three or four years that were worth a heck
of a lot more than when you bought them, and not using your money
to do it.
There's nothing mysterious, particularly, about it.
But, I went back, I went back to Johnson and the Vietnam War and
Nixon's inflation rates and uh, and why the savings and loans
companies wanted free, to be able to invest in all this tricky
stuff. And then, of course, we had the savings and loan fiasco.
Christie: So, does the change in ownership style have anything to
do with the change in management style? The fact that there used
to be an owner who was pretty much right there and very parental,
to owners that really weren't even visible to the workers, that
were investors ... ?
John:
I think that there's a lot of these situations in which
important decisions were made at the wrong level. Uh ... I ... I worry
about the fact, for example, that uh, decisions about your and my
education are made by a bunch of people in Charleston, I would say
that's the wrong level. And if you're from Kentucky, it was even
worse, because decisions about education systems were made by
Kentucky legislature for decades, very few of whom had ever been to
school. So, not only the level, but ignorant people. So, I think
that you do have that going on in a leverage buyout situation, that
people in Washington and ... and New York and San Francisco are
making decisions that affect your lives, our lives and that's not
necessarily a good thing. It's not what we believe in in terms of
democracy.
Uh ... on the other hand, that's always been true with this
region since peopl.e came in ....
END OF SIDE 1
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John:
... in fact uh, if you read things like Dennis, Dennis
Geordino who wrote ... about the Matewan Massacre and the battle of
Blair Mountain, uh, and when you listen to her talk about these
kinds of things, not only are these decisions made at the wrong
place in the wrong cities about us, but for example, in order for
people from the east coast to come in here and at the turn of the
century, and 20 years before, buy up all these things from the
hillbillies, all the mineral rights ... they had to actually show
that the hillbillies were a bunch of ignorant, dumb people anyway.
So, you had the, you had this long tradition of people from the
Washington Post and the New York Times coming in and finding really
scraggly-looking people and saying, "Well, it's okay.
They
wouldn't develop these resources anyway." It's a long tradition of
that.
Christie:
Yeah.
countries ... maybe?
John:

Don't

we

do

that

in

third

world

[laughing]

Christie:

I wouldn't doubt it.

John:
I also had
now ... [inaudible]

a

project

Sounds like something we do.
in

South

Africa going

on

right

Christie:
Well, how much ... well, maybe ... what is the trend in
factories moving to third world countries or developing
countries?
John: Uh ... the latest evidence is that it's coming back, that what
we did in ... in shipping our ... shipping a lot of our production off
shore, like to Mexico, and so on.
We were in very many cases,
shipping bad management practices off shore. In other words, say,
well, we can't manage the darn thing here in Huntington, let's move
it to uh, to uh, to Mexico, where it only costs us a dollar an hour
to be bad managers. And so there's a number of companies that are
realizing that they can do better here in the states, because the
American worker is still the most productive worker in the world,
in terms of value per labor hour.
Once again, that accounts for
our, our, we have, all you do is look around, we have a better
standard of living than in anybody else in the world. So, there is
a trend now, in the last five or six years, to move that stuff back
into the states . . Uh ... last night on Sixty Minutes, there was a,
showing garment workers in San Francisco or Los Angeles, (yeah, I
saw that) ... Rodeo Drive.
And the problem there, you say those
women are immigrant workers. They ... they can work here for $5 or
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they could work in their home country for less, so it's almost the
same workers, immigrants here, but they're....
The textile
industry is a very ... disloyal, I mean, it moves all over the place.
And uh, so, it's, that part is kind of interesting, when you look
at that. But for high skilled workers in glass and machinery and
metal bashing, and things like that, there's a strong feeling that
we could be anybody in the world, if we manage things properly.
And it's just stupidity on our part. I drive ... one of our cars is
a Mercury Tracer, made in a Nisson plant by Ford, Nisson-built
plant, in Mexico, and that plant has a higher, those cars coming
out of there are higher quality than the same car coming out of the
states, or Canada.
But it's got good management, it's a
beautifully designed plant, uh, and uh, I think that Ford, I
understand that Ford is thinking seriously of doing exactly the
same thing here in the states that it's doing in Mexico. So, this
idea of moving stuff off shore, that was very faddish in the '80's.
But when we looked at it closely, it's ... we were just moving bad
management practices.
Christie:

What was the lure?

John: The cheaper wage.
(cheaper wages ... would it have been like
workers conditions ... ?) yeah, environmental conditions.
At the
beginning of the NAFTA debate, there were a lot of union people
that would go to, to uh, Mexico and say, "Yeah, they had very low,
very bad environmental standards," and things like that. Uh ....
Christie:

You don't think that's a continuing lure?

John: We ... we don't, we don't really know, all we do know is that
there is a move on the part of certain companies to bring a lot of
this production back to the states. But uh ... it's not so much that
the workers in some of the other countries are ... are bad or, and
very often you're working in other countries where there's a lack
of infrastructure, a lot of government red tape, a lot of
corruption on the part of the government, and it's just not worth
the trouble. Uh ... certainly, we've always known of the problems in
places like Mexico, and so on, with everybody and his brother
taking money from 'em.
Some cases are just not worth the trouble
to do that kind of thing.
Of course, as I say, I worked for the
United Nations for 12, what 14 years total. And I'm in favor of
helping people in poor countries uh, be more productive.
And
people will say, "Well, won't that take jobs from people in the
United States?" I do believe we have to improve our education
system.
We have to train people better.
Uh, you know, you're a
graduate student in Sociology, my daughter was a graduate student
in sociology. When she came here, her uh, her masters degree, she
had a good project, I thought, it was 'How to Make Happy
Workplaces', it was a real good project and so on. But she ended
up on another masters thesis on, on uh, wage discrimination against
women and I just thought, well, yeah, that's true, that's a
problem.
It's been done to death, but uh, she's working as a
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marketer over at the Herald Dispatch.
I think that here and in
universities, and certainly secondary schools, we don't do as good
a job as we should, in terms of keeping our workers up to date.
It's not that we don't want to, but there seems to be institutional
barriers doing that kind of thing.
You have to give a hundred
twenty-eight hours before we'll let you go, regardless if you know
anything.
(right)
Christie: And what about keeping your workers happy? I mean, part
of what I saw with the workers at Owens is as far as idealizing the
older days, that there were baseball games on Saturday, and things
that the parental-type management was able to give them, to feel
like they had a home or a friends, or it was more than somewhere to
go and not think and just pack bottles. They enjoyed going.
John: There are two aspects: we, at that point, you know, in the
'20's, Europe and Japan's industrial capacity had been destroyed.
And in the '40' s and '50' s they were still rebuilding their
industrial capacity.
So, there were times in which we were the
only ones with any industrial capacity.
I mean, it was our
American workers that to me, that won the 1st and 2nd World War, so
we could afford to ... you know, there was a lot of fat in the land
that we could ... everybody else more or less has their industrial
capacity built and we're learning a lot from them.
I think it's
very important to have, to have a happy, healthy workplace.
I'm
not sure that you have to be a parental style management to do
that, though. This fellow that I'm talking about, Cadrachia
I mean, it's, when I show this video tape, one of the things that
shocks everybody is that he's up on stage as the leader, and it's
a Christmas party and he's rock and rolling with the secretaries
and workers and so on.
And for a manager to be able to let his
hair down that far, so everybody feels that they're part of the
family and so on, I don't think it has to be parental. I think you
can be very participative and have a very happy workplace.
And
it's, a lot of, a lot of companies are doing a pretty good job of
that.
And they' re not parental.
You think of Microsoft, for
pete' s sake.
Yeah, you can do a lot ... having everybody get
together for beer on Friday afternoon and ball teams and so
on ... but you don't have to be parental.
I think it's very
important.
I use an example of a guy just last year, trying to
turn this company around.
And uh, he analyzed it to death.
A
small company-200 employees.
And he finally figured out what he
had to do and what he had to do was to get rid of job titles. Uh,
he had to get a tremendous amount of participation. And he figured
out a way to do it.
And that was he invited everybody in to the
cafeteria at 4:30 and said, "Look, if we're gonna survive, we're
gonna have to turn things around and the first step is I want all
the managers to make dinner for all the employees, and you have to
do it for less tha.n $3 per employee and I'm going out and buy the
wine."
And he says, "Oh, by the way, here's the organization
chart," and his job wasn't even on it.
[laughter] So, yeah, you
have to do that.
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Christie:
I get the perception that ... with a leverage buyout, do
these people don't usually have a lot of say in the changes, or do
they? The investors ... I don't know how that works, but ... ?
John:
If you're gonna be a serious uh, leverage buyout type of
person, you've got to admit that right now leverage buyouts aren't,
aren't the popular thing to be doing.
But if you're going to be
serious of that, you have to find ways of, of uh ... of helping the
companies turn themselves around. And that often means assessing
management's capability to do that, and leaving them a place, if
they' re capable of doing it.
It's ... a number of people who do
leverage buyouts do not do it very well.
And uh, the Ravenswood
plant is probably one of the great, the great examples of .. . what
was this guy's name?
Cash or Gold, or ... in other words ... he
lives ... he lives in Switzerland, and uh, wow, I can't think of his
name .... He lives in Switzerland, he can't come back to the states
uh, 'cause he's for income tax evasion. The management team that
he put into Ravenswood was, as far as I can tell, God-awful.
So
you've got to have that part of it right.
You have to be able
to ... to get some management who can, with uh, who can work to turn
it around. And hopefully they're all, they're in place, they can
do it. Certainly with ACF around here, we're pretty sure that even
though it's owned by not KKR, but the other one ... starts with a K,
uh, they have pretty good management and much of it is home grown.
You know, I ... I ... I had suspected and then I found that it wasn't
really true, that a lot of the manage-, a lot of the problems we
have in terms of bringing engineering type management into plants,
is that you have the local culture, everybody's from Apple Grove or
Wayne County or something like that.
And they've been there for
generations.
And you bring these fresh, snot-nosed engineering
graduates in from WVU and something, and they're not the managers
(right), and I thought, well, maybe that's what Owens was doing.
But I didn't get that impression at all (mmmh). Uh ... so, you know,
even if you're a financial person, and you're very good at finance,
you have to have people with you who can assess management and
motivate management and uh, turn the plant around. Otherwise the
stuff that you bought, you have to throw all of it away. You have
to improve the good stuff, salvage the good stuff.
Christie: So you attribute most of this particular plant's
problem as being unable to turn management around, or change the
management/worker relations?
John: I don't know. I mean, it was so tied up with ... here we are,
we're competing against plastic containers.
We didn't seem to be,
within Owens-Brockway,
or whatever,
really developing good
management.
I got the impression we weren't doing that.
But I
can't figure out why not, because I know that Corning, OwensCorning and so on,·they're very technologically astute. You go to
their area up around New York state, and they've got good
technology and things like that.
I ... it seemed like it was just
a whole combination of factors, that it wasn't just management, and
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it wasn't, they had this whole plant and needed to keep reinvesting
in it and to me it was probably people not paying close attention,
a little bit like Chrysler. The government bailed them out in '81,
and then they started not paying attention to the business again.
And then, okay, they started paying attention again in '85, and
maybe they lost, they didn't pay ... if you ... I kind of follow the
automobile industry certainly more than the glass industry.
And
you very often wonder whether the next guys that are taking over
Chrysler or Ford or General Motors, are really, what they call car
guys, is really interested in product. Under General Motors, you
know, when Roger Smith stepped down and Stimple came in, and it
really did look like the management was just kind of trying to take
care of it's own, and really wasn't very good at being car people.
That may have been true here.
We didn't have enough people that
loved glass, and wanted to see new kinds of products.
I ... I ... I
think it was very complicated.
Christie:
Yeah.
One of the, the man who was managing, Dennis
Silvis, I interviewed him, and he talked about what he believed to
be a trend, which we were just talking about about 10 minutes ago.
That in general, in the world, global economy, that all the
factories, industries, were gonna be moving to like developing
countries and ours would be a service economy. Now you were just
saying that you thought that they were, companies were bringing the
factories back into the United States.
John: Okay.
If you look at, look at the levels of your economy,
primary being extraction and agriculture, and then the next level
being manufacturing, and retail, or manufacturing and service and
retail, uh, and you know, when my grandparents were alive, it was
mostly agriculture and extraction, and only maybe a third of
employment was in manufacturing.
And then when my parents were
alive,
40,
50%,
certainly
the
high
wage
jobs
were
in
manufacturing ... uh ... I do not believe that a country survives very
well without a good agricultural base, a manufacturing base and a
good service base. Having lived in Switzerland and realized that
the United States exports a tremendous amount of agricultural
products, like anybody's talking, and we have in terms of
agriculture, we have the most productive agriculture in the world,
too.
Uh ... we want to ship rice to Japan, so the Japanese can pay
15 cents a pound, rather than whatever it is, 3 or 4 dollars a
pound.
So, I don't believe that you can hollow out any level of
your, of your economy. If you're gonna want to have a good strong
agriculture, you're gonna have to have good strong manufacturing,
and good strong services.
And services just isn't you know, as
they said in the what? Bush, Reagan era, it's not just sweeping
around Japanese computers and flipping hamburgers.
Services
are ... you're going into the service business.
I'm in the service
business. Uh ... these KKR people are in the service business. As
a matter of fact, when you look at a manufacturing company, a very
small proportion of the people in the manufacturing industry are
actually manufacturing anything.
Most of them are in services.
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They're in sales, and they're in purchasing and they're in
accounting and so on.
So, to some extent we have a problem of
classification.
And uh, in the international labor organization
where I was, that's where a lot of the international classification
of job structures come from.
And you have to keep updating it.
Because,
ten
years
ago,
if
you
looked
at
service
job
classifications, you'd have the banker and the baker and the
candlestick maker, all in one group.
And on the other side, you
would have 15 different types of welders and 45 different types of
lathe operators. So, it very detailed kinds of operations of the
manufacturing side, but we didn't have very much detail, in terms
of this kind of computer programmer, or versus that kind of
computer programming and so on. So uh, I, I feel that we're gonna
continue to manufacture things that we should manufacture.
And
hopefully, other people will manufacture stuff that we, we
shouldn't be manufacturing. And in the discussion we had with out
jobs, our children, our future a couple of months ago, some woman
said, "Well, we don't make tennis shoes in the United States
anymore, but we sure do design them and we sell them and we
distribute them," and so on. And maybe it's good for the Taiwani's
and Malaysians and so on, to manufacture tennis shoes. One of the
strategic thinkers in our business, a guy by the name of Michael
Porter, from Harvard, is, wrote a book about five years ago about
the competitive damage of nations. And he took a sabbatical from
Harvard and went around the world, and spent about six months in
Singapore.
And the Singapore government said, "Well, we want to
get out of the business of, of producing cheap stuff in Singapore.
We want to do something else." And he said, "Well, you ought to
get in the business of exporting gray matter," said, "just like the
people in Silicon Valley are doing, that's what you do." People in
Silicon Valley and the computer field and so on, they don't
necessarily manufacture all this stuff. Some of it comes, some of
the chips come from Malaysia and some chips come from Taiwan. But
the gray matter that went into it, the thinking and so on, goes on,
in uh, in uh, Silicon Valley.
So, I think we have to be rather
careful about what it, there were, we certainly do not want to get
to hollow out our manufacturing base.
But to have a good
manufacturing base, we have to do a lot more than think that if
your second rate citizen, if you go to an auto shop or metal
working shop, or wood working shop, cause working in, working in
Europe, your skilled people, the people that could make something
really smooth, or two pieces of metal that would really fit
together very well, were very highly skilled. And industry and the
school system, with their, with their apprenticeship system,
cooperated very well to produce those people. Interestingly enough
BMW and Mercedes are better off producing stuff in South Carolina
and Alabama right now, than they are in Germany.
They have very
skilled people in Germany, but they also have probably a bit
uncompetitive soc~al structure, in terms of they're paying German
workers a heck of a lot more than they have to pay people in South
Carolina and Alabama.
As long as we can produce, we can develop
our skilled people, uh, so that we can do all the fine work, and
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then we're gonna be doing ....
I think that's a good example.
I
mean, just think, BMW ... the idea of flying in BMW engines and
flying BMW's back to Europe on 747's is an indication that we still
have a pretty productive industry.
Now, the idea would be of
course, to produce those BMW engines here in the United States. I
think we can do that, too.
Christie: What about all the low and unskilled labor that goes on
at plants? I mean, there is a lot of low, less skilled, unskilled
laborers. In the assembly line, like I'm saying, you just do your
small part very de-skilling of labor (mmm-hmm) ... it seems to be a
trend that a lot of these plant, and these people are trying to go
back to school to get some kind of new skill, because they
haven't ... not necessarily new skill, but a skill or uh, some kind
of education, cause they're assuming nothing's gonna come, I mean,
if they don't have a role in any other ....
John: One of the nice trends in the United States, is this like in
this, next door in Kentucky, we have uh, new types of, of uh, what
uh, tech had, I can't think what you call it. But the idea is if
you're in secondary school, you're not necessarily a second rate
citizen to go into a technology college and things like that, that
you have to go ... it's not necessary that you go to, to a
university.
Now, that's part of the, of the flow of, of people
that can become technically skilled.
You have to make sure that
there's, that people don't feel ashamed of getting good technical
skills. At the same time, competitive industry ... ! think here of
D & E Foundries here in town, Rubberlite here in town, they don't
necessarily go out and hire people at, at the, at the gate, as was
described here at Owens-Brockway. You show up at 7:00 and they'll
pick you and you and you.
Competitive industry in the United
States will say, "Okay," take Honda at Marysville and so on, "you
have to come in and write an essay about why uh, Honda should hire
you."
And then some of these plants, I remember particularly
Flatrock, Michigan, which is a Mazda-Ford plant, you go through a
process of say, "okay, now, before we really put you out on the
floor, to see if we really want to keep you, we want you to
disassemble and reassemble this uh, flashlight. We'll give you a
flashlight and see if you've got the finger skills to disassemble
it and put it back together. Oh, that's pretty good. Now, we're
interested in people like that.
Now, can you show somebody else
over here how to do that? Could you pass that skill on?" So uh,
to, to some extent, to a lot of extent, really competitive industry
uses certain kinds of techniques, where they don't just pick up
anybody. They want to make sure that maybe you haven't learned all
the finger skills and teaching skills that you should have in
school. But if you have the innate ability to do that, then we're
gonna train you all the rest of the, all the rest of the ways that
we need to.
The .companies that you talk about, that feel that
people are lumps, lumps of coal, lumps of muscle and things like
that, are basically the kinds of companies that I don't think can
afford to pay $15 an hour in the United States.
Those kinds of
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jobs have to go somewhere else, and we have to have more, more
people who are really interested in having fun in the job, not just
out on the baseball field and things like that.
(right, right)
And some companies are, some companies have figured out how to do
that.
D & E for example, and a lot of companies, manufacturing
companies around here, don't bring you in and uh, run you through
personnel, they' 11 call up Manpower and they' 11 say, "Well, we need
some people like this.
Send them over."
And then those people
will come from Manpower-they're still on Manpower's payroll, the
company's still paying Manpower.
And then if the other workers
say, "Hey, this is a pretty sharp cookie, we ought to bring that
person on," and the workers themselves will sit around at lunch
time and say, "Well, I'm going off hunting this week, taking part
of my vacation. Oh, you work for Manpower, you don't get any, do
you?"
And they begin socializing the person in, once they've
decided that's the person we want on our team. Because our bonus
and our uh, incentive pay and so on, is based on having other
people who carry their share .
So, the de- skilled kinds of
situation, I don't think they're competitive today. Those are the
kinds of factories that are going somewhere else .
Christie:
And that's the kind of thing that management really
needs to work on, in order to keep it in the United States. -(mmmhmm, yeah) Well, uh ... [pause] . . . is there anything that you wanted
to talk about, that I didn't bring up? (no) How representative do
you think that this Owens plant is of all the different plant
closings around the United States? Is it ... is it uh, patterning?
Is it part of a pattern?
John: I think these kind of, the kind of situation that we had at
Owens, we either turn it around or it becomes a parking lot. That
was certainly what was happening down in Chemical Valley, down in
Charleston, that you either get, you either use the, the hands and
the brains of the people, or that plant, that plant ... doesn't
necessarily migrate outside the states, because uh, the stuff down
in Chemical Valley is near that salt bed, so you don't take really
take that plant.
But, one of the things we didn't mention about
Owens is that there isn't really any great local supplies of
limestone and sand and things like that.
So that is a kind of a
plant that can migrate. Uh ... Corbin here in Huntington and in uh,
Kentucky, right across, they have say a thousand employees in
Kentucky and a couple hundred here in Huntington, they talk about
migrating across the state line unless we get our workman's
compensation act together.
And there's other kinds of taxes in
West Virginia that, that are a bit punitive to business.
For
example, with SOMAR moving in here and ASPEN, SOMAR being a
telemarketing company, and ASPEN being a kind of a data processing
company, processing legal, legal documents, they don't have any
real inventory.
One of the taxes we have here in the state is
every once a year we see how much we've got in inventory and we tax
you on it.
And so, that takes companies like, it makes it more
difficult for companies like ACF and uh, Transfab and Owens22

Brockway to make it here, because they're paying an inventory tax
they wouldn't pay in a neighboring state. Interestingly, in terms
of, you take a number like ACF, uh, makes $50,000 a piece box cars,
very nice, the cadillacs of the industry. And they don't just make
'em here in Huntington.
They make 'em over in Milton,
Pennsylvania, and so on. Their workers compensation costs here in
West Virginia is four times, and maybe more, I forget what ... ! knew
the numbers. It's like $700 per car in Pennsylvania, and something
like $5000 per car in West Virginia. So, there ... there things that
make it difficult to do business here. That's, that's one of the
things that we've got to look at.
We have a very democraticoriented legislature. And I think, in effect, rightly so. I mean,
the coal industry was a rather brutal kind of industry, so we have
a long tradition of, of nasty labor relations, futile style labor
relations in the state. And that reflected in our legislation and
added to some of our legislators, certainly our voters.
And it
makes it difficult for a company like Owens to stay. We have one
example of a trucking company that moved across the river last year
and I think save something like $200,000 a year in workers
compensation costs. (right)
Christie:
And this state is in dire need of getting some
investments and business.
(mmm-hmm) So you think it's the legal
structure that really ... affects, as far as from state to state, for
West Virginia?
John: Well, I know the Chamber of Commerce is very, very agitated
about that, [inaudible].
But if you listen, once again, if you
listen to the, the management of ASPEN coming in with 500 jobs in
the last week, and SOMAR coming in with 200, you didn't hear that.
And uh, so I'm kind of wondering whether, you know, SOMAR coming
has most of its operations in North Carolina, maybe they have a
goofed up workers compensation, too. [laughing]
Christie: Yeah. Well, I think I touched on everything.
anything else you thought was important?
John:

I think that, I look at my note, I think we're okay.

Christie:

E
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Was there

D

Great.

Thank you very much.

0

F

I

23

N

T

E

R

V

I

E

w

